Scenario in UK

Cases

Godfrey v. Demon Internet Limited (1999)
One of the few UK cases to date is Laurence Godfrey v Demon Internet Limited (1999) which highlighted the difficulties in applying the Defamation Act to libelous statements on the Internet. It considered in detail the role of ISP's in relation to the Act.

In that case, someone unknown purported to be Mr. Laurence Godfrey, a British physicist, posted defamatory material concerning him to a newsgroup in the US on 13 January 1999. The posting followed a path from its originating US ISP to the Defendants' (Demon) news server in the UK where Demon's customers could read it. On 17 January 1997, the real Mr. Godfrey informed Demon of the existence of the posting and the fact that it was fraudulent and defamatory and requested that the posting be removed. Unfortunately, Demon failed to take action and the posting continued to be available on its news server until it expired in the usual way ten days later.

In its defense, Demon said that it was not the author, editor or publisher of the statement i.e. it was one of the excluded categories. The court agreed. It was merely involved as an operator or provider of access to a communications system through which the statement was made available. However, the court disagreed its fulfillment of the other two parts of the s.1 test that Demon failed to take reasonable care in relation to the publication of the defamatory posting. It was a fact that Demon had been notified of the posting by the real Mr. Godfrey and requested to take immediate and appropriate action, so Demon could no longer say that it had no reason to believe that what it did caused or contributed to the publication of a defamatory statement.

The conclusion was even fortified by the contents of the Consultation Document issued by the Lord Chancellor's Department in July 1995 which said that the defense of innocent dissemination has never provided an absolute immunity for distributors, however mechanical their contribution. It does not protect those who knew that the material they were handling was defamatory, or who ought to have known of its nature. Those safeguards are preserved, so that the defense is not available to a defendant who knew that his act involved or contributed to publication defamatory of the plaintiff. It is available only if, having taken all reasonable care, the defendant had no reason to suspect that his act had that effect. Sub-sections (5) and (6) of the Act describe factors which will be taken into account in determining whether the defendant took all reasonable care.